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AZ, United States
There are two main paradigms for brain-related science, with different implications for
brain-focused intervention or advancement. The paradigm of homeostasis (“stability
through constancy,” Walter Cannon), originating from laboratory-based experimental
physiology pioneered by Claude Bernard, shows that living systems tend to maintain
system functionality in the direction of constancy (or similitude). The aim of physiology
is to elucidate the factors that maintain homeostasis, and therapeutics aim to correct
abnormal factor functions. The homeostasis paradigm does not formally recognize
influences outside its controlled experimental frames and it is variable in its modeling
of neural contributions. The paradigm of allostatic orchestration (PAO) extends the
principle of allostasis (“stability through change”) as originally put forth by Peter Sterling.
The PAO originates from an evolutionary perspective and recognizes that biological
set points change in anticipation of changing environments. The brain is the organ of
central command, orchestrating cross-system operations to support optimal behavior
at the level of the whole organism. Alternative views of blood pressure regulation
and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) illustrate differences between the paradigms.
For the PAO, complexities of top-down neural effects and environmental context are
foundational (not to be “factored out”), and anticipatory regulation is the principle of their
interface. The allostatic state represents the integrated totality of brain-body interactions.
Health itself is an allostatic state of optimal anticipatory oscillation, hypothesized
to relate to the state of criticality, a mathematical point of poise between phases,
on the border between order and disorder (or the “edge of chaos”). Diseases are
allostatic states of impaired anticipatory oscillations, demonstrated as rigidifications of
set points across the brain and body (disease comorbidity). Conciliation of the paradigms
is possible, with “reactive homeostasis” resolved as an illusion stemming from the
anticipation of environmental monotony. Considerations are presented with respect
to implications of the two paradigms for brain-focused intervention or advancement;
the hypothesis that the state of criticality is a vehicle for evolutionary processes;
concordance with a philosophy of freedom based on ethical individualism as well as self-
creativity, non-obsolescence, empowerment, and citizenship; and concluding reflections
on the science and ethics of the placebo, and the potential for virtuous cycles of
brain-Anthropocene interactions.
Keywords: homeostasis, allostasis, evolution, blood pressure, posttraumatic stress disorder, complexity,
criticality, neuroethics
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
The human brain is the most precious resource on our planet.
Excitement about the brain takes many forms, and actions on
behalf of the brain go in many different directions. It may be
valuable to articulate and clarify whether there are particular
approaches to the brain that favor the recognition of particular
categories of data, and whether they lead to different goals and
strategies for intervention. Such an exercise may help visualize
alternative trajectories for brain-related advancement at the level
of ‘‘broad brush strokes.’’
This essay contends that there are two main paradigms
(Kuhn, 1962) for brain science and brain-focused intervention.
The earlier views the brain as one organ among others, a
collection of cells and tissues that regulates itself on the basis
of corrective feedback. The latter views the brain as the seat of
central command for the organism as a whole, and one that
operates on the basis of anticipatory regulation. The current
dominance of the earlier paradigm tends to obscure recognition
that its associated explanations entail the cropping of large
swaths of data, which are central to the latter. From the point
of view of biological theory, the core difference between the
paradigms derives from the latter’s evolutionary perspective,
which entails greater recognition of the relationships between
the brain and the body, and between the brain and the
natural environment. The objective of this presentation is to
explore historical, scientific, interventional, and other differences
between the two paradigms, so that innovators, researchers,
practitioners, policy-makers, patients, end-users, and others
can gain clarity with respect to both the explicit and implicit
assumptions associated with brain advancement agendas of
any kind.
Over the course of three decades, a series of brain-centric,
evolution-inspired insights have been articulated with increasing
refinement, as principles of allostasis (Sterling and Eyer, 1988;
Sterling, 2004, 2012, 2014). Allostasis recognizes that the role
of the brain is to serve as the integrative center for anticipatory
regulation, to orchestrate operations across systems, and thereby
support behavioral optimality for successful interaction with
the environment at large. Because ensuing usage of the term
‘‘allostasis’’ by other investigators has sometimes not recognized
the full significance of the brain-centric and cross-system
perspective first put forth by Sterling, this article refers to the
paradigm of allostatic orchestration (PAO), to point toward his
original ideas and to extend them.
The essay reviews the origins and principles of homeostasis
and allostasis and illustrates their differences by considering
how they approach the phenomena of blood pressure regulation
and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). It contends that
the Sterling principle of allostasis is sufficiently different
that it warrants characterization as a new paradigm—the
PAO—which is articulated as a set of propositions, and it
also contends that the two paradigms can be conciliated.
Selected considerations are presented pertaining to their different
interventional implications; a falsifiable model regarding the
vehicle or mechanism of evolutionary processes; the alignment
of the PAO with a philosophy of freedom; and the proposed
utility of allostatic planning and action in the context of the
Anthropocene epoch.
THE PARADIGM OF HOMEOSTASIS
Origins of Homeostasis
The career of Claude Bernard, generally considered to be
the father of modern experimental physiology, encompassed
seminal discoveries including the role of the pancreas in
digestion and the glycogenic function of the liver. He conducted
numerous studies showing the influence of the brain and
nervous system on digestive processes, and in 1858 he reported
neural regulation of blood vessel dilation. Yet it was his
experimental methodology itself that proved to be his greatest
legacy. As a pioneer for the scientific revolution and the role
of the laboratory, Bernard brought reductive physico-chemical
observation and reasoning to the study of living organisms,
even as he approached his work with reliance on a form of
intuition that led him to be critical of strict positivism or
doctrinaire materialism (Grmek, 2008). Though not a ‘‘vitalist,’’
Bernard ‘‘attributed a ‘directive and creative’ idea to life’’ which
also necessitated the use of vivisectional techniques for the
revelation of findings not demonstrable otherwise. Eventually
he came to categorize life into three different forms, and of
the third category—higher vertebrates—he proclaimed that only
they were truly ‘‘free,’’ in that they alone possessed the complex
mechanisms which permitted them to maintain the fixity of
physical conditions (temperature, nutritional substrates, acidity,
etc.)—the milieu interieur (Bernard, 1878)—that is necessary
for life.
Historians typically credit Walter Cannon for being the
giant who received the kernel of Bernard’s concept of the
milieu interieur, and amplified it as the concept of homeostasis
(Cooper, 2008). As an experimentalist, he was among the first
to use roentgenography to characterize the workings of the
digestive system. Critically, he observed that when animals were
emotionally excited there was a cessation of gastric and intestinal
function, and he went on to establish that the sympathetic
nervous system was deployed under ‘‘emergency’’ circumstances.
During World War I he conducted research on the causes of
acidosis after traumatic shock, and subsequently he developed
numerous techniques for investigation of the autonomic nervous
system including the chemical transmission of neural impulses
(Benison and Barger, 2008).
Potentially, it may have been his studies of sugar mobilization
in the setting of insulin-induced hypoglycemia, that may have
spurred his attention to the organizing principle of homeostasis.
Cannon credited Bernard as being the first to give a ‘‘precise
analysis’’ to the general idea that living beings have a special
capacity to maintain their stability in the face of the changing
environment, and then refined his own understanding as the
following set of postulates (1929):
1. In an open system such as our bodies represent, compounded
of unstable material and subjected continually to disturbing
conditions, constancy is in itself evidence that agencies are
acting, or ready to act, to maintain this constancy.
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2. If a state remains steady it does so because any tendency
towards change is automatically met by increased
effectiveness of the factor or factors which resist the change.
3. Any factor which operates to maintain a steady state by action
in one direction does not also act at the same point in the
opposite direction.
4. Homeostatic agents, antagonistic in one region of the body,
may be cooperative in another region.
5. The regulating system which determines a homeostatic state
may comprise a number of cooperating factors brought into
action at the same time or successively.
6. When a factor is known which can shift a homeostatic state
in one direction, it is reasonable to look for automatic control
of that factor or for an opposite factor or factors having an
opposite effect.
In concordance with these postulates, laboratory physiological
research from the early twentieth century and beyond has made
tremendous progress in the understanding of factorswhich move
system parameters in one direction or another.
Examples of Homeostasis
Actors and Anomalies in the Homeostatic
Understanding of Blood Pressure Regulation
Blood pressure regulation is a phenomenon exhaustively studied
under the homeostatic paradigm. The main actors for blood
pressure maintenance include the heart, which acts as a pump;
the vessels, which constrict and relax as they transport blood
throughout the body; and the kidneys, which manage blood
volume by filtering fluid and conserving sodium to preserve
osmotic pressures. Exhaustive search for the factors of blood
pressure regulation and their sites of production or action has
led to recognition that the adrenal glands, lungs, and liver
also play roles. The main ‘‘equation’’ renders blood pressure to
be a function of cardiac output and total vascular resistance,
analogous to Ohm’s law in physics where the voltage in an
electrical circuit is calculated as the product of current and
resistance. Cardiac output is itself a product of heart rate and
stroke volume, with stroke volume, in turn, being influenced
by blood volume (‘‘preload’’), the pressure against which the
heart must contract (‘‘afterload’’), and the strength of each
contraction (contractility). If sensors in the carotid artery or
kidney detect a decrease in blood pressure, there will be a
cascade of factor actions that alter volume, vascular resistance,
and cardiac output, to increase it. If they detect a rise in
blood pressure, there will be cascades in the opposite direction.
Life itself—through the capacity for homeostasis—is given the
credit for checks and balances that preserve the normal level of
blood pressure.
When the system fails to maintain its normal state—for
example hypertension, the state of persistent blood pressure
elevation—then causes are sought in the various factors which
would otherwise return the blood pressure to ‘‘normal.’’
Yet though there are certain well-characterized abnormalities
of homeostatic mechanisms, that are correctable causes of
hypertension—for example renal artery stenosis or endocrine
tumors—many anomalies arise when explaining blood pressure
regulation as the steady state of local tissue factors. Ninty-
five percentage of individuals with hypertension are deemed
to have a type that has no identifiable local factor as the
cause (Carretero and Oparil, 2000). Among them are those
with ‘‘white coat’’ hypertension, defined as blood pressure
that is elevated when measured in a clinic setting, and not
elevated when measured outside the clinic (Pickering et al.,
1988). Nor can local factors explain why some forms of
sudden psychological disruption should be associated with an
immediate and sharp drop of blood pressure (that can be
extreme enough to produce loss of consciousness, i.e., vasovagal
syncope), not corrected by an immediate rise. Furthermore a
therapeutic anomaly of the homeostasis paradigm is shown
in evidence which indicates that ‘‘mental’’ (non-physical)
interventions, that by definition do not ‘‘directly’’ interact
with any known physical factors, can nonetheless have an
impact on blood pressure (albeit to modest degrees, e.g.,
Bai et al., 2015). Despite inordinate study of blood pressure
homeostasis, the complexity of factor interactions (or the
difficulty of accommodating anomalies) is reflected in the
absence of a consistent schematic across textbooks of physiology
or medicine, to represent a broad scientific consensus regarding
its essential mechanisms.
Progress and Limits in the Homeostatic
Understanding of PTSD
PTSD is commonly conceptualized as being a ‘‘psychological’’
condition, one that may ensue following the experience of a
non-physical trauma (e.g., an emotional shock, such as being
witness to a violent event). Thus, studies which aim to explore
physical changes in PTSD are themselves conducted in some
defiance of reductive explanation based on physical factors
alone. Nonetheless, stimuli can be carefully designed with the
intention of producing controlled forms of trauma within a
laboratory setting, and the brain can be taken to be the organ
of behavior (akin to the heart, vascular system and kidneys being
the organs of blood pressure). By refining such frameworks for
experimentation, specific physical factors for PTSD have been
sought in cellular failures to extinguish associative conditioning
between environmental cues and fear learning mechanisms
(VanElzakker et al., 2014), and studies of individuals with PTSD
(or those at increased risk for it) have demonstrated alterations in
brain circuits for processing and modulation of the emotions, a
variety of dysregulations in neurohormonal activity patterns, and
genetic and other differences compared to control populations
(Yehuda et al., 2015). Laboratory investigation has led to a
dramatic expansion in the understanding of brain functionality
beyond the condition of PTSD, as such studies have valuably
elucidated much of the neural mechanics of our far-reaching
arousal and stress response systems.
Yet a slew of anomalies arises when understanding for
PTSD depends on a reductionist focus on any single factor,
category of variable, or level of analysis or intervention. In
the first place, fundamental complexity pertaining to ‘‘PTSD’’
is evidenced by the observation that among some military
populations the condition is not even fully recognized as
a ‘‘disease’’ (Fisher, 2014), and instead, its phenomenology
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is conceptualized as a ‘‘normal’’ feature of the vocation. In
some cases, a traumatic event may lead to an alternative and
‘‘positive’’ trajectory of posttraumatic growth (Tedeschi and
Calhoun, 2004), which may depend significantly on cognitive
processing that has not been shown to be a determined
outcome of neural processes. In another vein related to
cognitive appraisal, PTSD symptom severity may be associated
with veterans’ perception of their homecoming reception
(Johnson et al., 1997). Yet at the other pole of perception for
the ‘‘physical reality’’ of PTSD, patients diagnosed with the
condition have increased risk for organ system impacts including
cardiovascular disease (Beristianos et al., 2016), metabolic
disturbances (Farr et al., 2015), and accelerated physiological
aging (Williamson et al., 2015). In the realm of therapeutics,
a recent review lamented that ‘‘. . .at a time when there are
more biological findings in PTSD than in almost any other
psychiatric disorder, there are no drug targets’’ (McFarlane
et al., 2017). The relative lack of traction is further shown
in the limitations of even ‘‘evidence-based’’ forms of trauma-
specific cognitive therapies for PTSD (Steenkamp et al., 2015),
which have high drop-out rates (Najavits, 2015) and minimal
impact on the fundamental problem of sleep disturbance
(Pruiksma et al., 2016).
THE STERLING-EYER PRINCIPLE OF
ALLOSTASIS
Origins of Allostasis
Through the mid-nineteenth century, geologists and naturalists
increasingly debated whether life forms on earth had all existed
throughout time, or whether they had evolved from one form
into another. For those who held an evolutionary perspective,
the mechanism of change had remained a mystery. In 1858,
the same year that Claude Bernard discovered neural regulation
of the blood vessels (and one year after Bernard introduced
the concept of the ‘‘milieu interieur’’), the naturalist Alfred
Russel Wallace wrote a letter to Charles Darwin in which he
proposed that species may change through the pressures of
scarcity generated by nature itself, which would lead to the
differential reproductive success of some variants over others.
Subsequently, Darwin (1859) published On the Origins of Species
by Means of Natural Selection, or, the Preservation of the
Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, and the influence of
evolutionary thinking on subsequent science, culture, religion,
and governance, can hardly be overestimated. By placing us in
a lineage with other primates, Darwin’s writings stand out as the
second decisive science-based humbling for the human species.
At the same time, the vastly expanded perspective entailed by
evolutionary thinking has encouraged a cosmological context for
the human imagination.
The neuroscientist Peter Sterling has given the following
account (2004) of the origins of allostasis, beginning with
a personal appreciation for the influence of environmental
context on biological regulation. In the 1960s, Sterling was
working as both a neuroscientist and a social activist, and while
canvassing in African-American communities he noticed that
many individuals had limps or facial droops indicative of a
history of stroke, as a consequence of the high prevalence of
hypertension. Over the next two decades, Sterling integrated
his naturalistic observation, which was being confirmed in
epidemiological studies of the links between social disruption
and chronic disease, with other growing bodies of knowledge.
There were electron microscopic findings of the ubiquity of
nerve fibers on blood vessels, endocrine cells, and elsewhere,
suggesting that ‘‘the brain has close access to essentially every
somatic cell,’’ and also primate studies showing that demands
for sustained attention caused elevations of blood pressure and
release of catabolic hormones.
Eventually Sterling and Eyer synthesized these insights as the
principle of allostasis (1988), which states that ‘‘an organism
must vary all the parameters of its internal milieu and match
them appropriately to environmental demands.’’ If an individual
is exposed to an environmental condition presenting potential
danger and high need for vigilance, the brain orchestrates
systems on an anticipatory basis, toward a physiological arousal
state that is a match for those demands (Sterling and Eyer,
1988). For a context of social disruption, characterized by the
persistence of perceived danger, the brain’s natural behavior
is to produce a sustained state of high physiological arousal.
Thus, whereas homeostasis models the cause of hypertension by
pointing to abnormal functionality of the heart, blood vessels,
kidneys or molecular signaling, allostasis explains that the brain
is deliberately directing these organs on an anticipatory basis, in
concert and with respect to context, to produce an elevation of
blood pressure for delivery of resources (glucose, oxygen) to the
large muscle groups.
Allostasis Resolves Anomalies in the
Homeostatic Model of Blood Pressure
Regulation
Under allostasis, the phenomena of essential hypertension,
white coat hypertension, vasovagal hypotension, andmeditation-
induced reductions of blood pressure are no longer anomalous.
They are all due to the transduction of influences—chronic
or acute stressors, other environmental variables, or mental
training—from the brain to the cardiovascular system. Many
(not all) homeostatic schematics of blood pressure regulation
do highlight the brainstem centers of the autonomic nervous
system; direct neural control and afferent signaling between the
brain, heart and blood vessels; and neural ganglia at the kidneys.
Nonetheless, the role of neocortical influences on the brainstem
and autonomic signaling has yet to be understood in depth, and
the full significance of these pathways for neural influence has
yet to be appreciated across physiological subspecialties, clinical
medicine or public health.
For example, there is now an expansive corpus of studies
that have provided an increasingly granular appreciation for
the environmental factors associated with blood pressure,
including an early report from Bevan et al. (1969). In groups
of normotensive, hypertensive, and borderline hypertensive
individuals, blood pressure has been shown to be higher in
work environments compared to home or during sleep, for all
three groups (Pickering et al., 1982). The concept of ‘‘masked
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hypertension’’ (Pickering et al., 2002) points to individuals who
show elevated blood pressure outside the clinic setting—that
is likely to be of pathological significance—with lower-range
readings at the clinic. Ambulatory and home-based readings
show that blood pressure is higher in the winter (Sega et al.,
1998), and furthermore weather-dependent variations in blood
pressure appear to be explained by a synoptic measure of air
mass, and not by differences in temperature, cloud cover, relative
humidity, atmospheric pressure, or wind speed on a univariate
basis (Morabito et al., 2008).
The brain-centric allostatic perspective in conjunction with
the polyvagal theory (Porges, 2007) can also explain the
existence of both hypertensive and hypotensive responses
to an acute psychological stressor (fighting vs. fainting).
The existence of variability for production of these starkly
different response directionalities may reflect a hierarchical
organization of autonomic response patterns that derive
from evolutionary phylogeny—the fight or flight response
characteristic of mammals produces more behavioral options (at
a higher metabolic cost), compared to the ‘‘freeze’’ mode more
dominant in reptiles. With respect to a potential mechanism, it
has been contended that likelihood to engage a fight vs. a freeze
response may be influenced by variability in individual traumatic
stress histories, which are ‘‘imprinted’’ as differential patterns of
activity at the level of the right and left cerebral hemispheres, and
especially the insular cortex (Lee et al., 2014).
Too, the Sterling principle of allostasis may shed light on
the controversy around the role of salt consumption as a factor
in hypertension. The allostasis perspective is consistent with
the idea that dietary salt may be not a culprit but rather
an ‘‘innocent bystander’’ (DiNicolantonio et al., 2017). It is
the brain itself, under stress, that establishes an elevated set
point for blood pressure, and a variety of physiological and
behavioral mechanismsmay be recruited accordingly—including
a propensity for salt consumption, in order to maintain a higher
circulatory volume. Thus, while low-salt diet interventions for
hypertension management may lead to short-term reductions
of blood pressure, they also appear to result in increased
levels of renin, aldosterone, and adrenergic tone (Graudal
et al., 2017)—driven by the brain, to compensate for the
relative volume depletion. This explanatory framework adds
weight to the unanswered question of whether a low-salt diet
has benefits—or even harms—as a strategy for cardiovascular
adverse event prevention (Braam et al., 2017).
THE PARADIGM OF ALLOSTATIC
ORCHESTRATION (PAO)
Allostasis—From Principles to Paradigm
In his chapter-length exposition (2004), Sterling articulated
allostasis as the following set of principles: (1) organisms
are designed for efficiency; (2) efficiency requires reciprocal
trade-offs (managed by the brain); (3) efficiency requires
predicting (by the brain) what will be needed; (4) prediction
requires each sensor to adapt its sensitivity to the expected
range of input; (5) prediction requires each effector to adapt
its output to the expected range of demand; and (6) predictive
regulation depends on behavior whose neural mechanisms
also adapt.
An objective of the present essay, addressed in greater depth
in Section ‘‘Conciliation of the Two Paradigms,’’ is to help resolve
questions and occasional debate as to whether the concepts
or principles of allostasis merit the cognitive costs that come
with the introduction of new language. Post-Sterling, many have
used the allostasis concept to refer to the general phenomenon
that biological set points become temporarily altered under the
condition of acute environmental stress (and also in order to
point toward the concept of allostatic load, reviewed in Section
‘‘Propositions of the PAO’’). Yet Cannon himself recognized
that systems do not maintain absolute constancy in their set
points, and he was careful to note that he had chosen the prefix
‘‘homeo’’ (similar) rather than ‘‘homo’’ (same) when coining the
term homeostasis (1929). It seems likely that the answer to the
question, whether or not allostasis is simply homeostasis in ‘‘new
clothes,’’ lies mainly in Sterling’s heightened appreciation for
the brain. Sterling’s recognition that the brain is necessary as a
dedicated organ for higher-order processing, for management
of trade-offs or anticipatory orchestration among actors, is in
some respects the same conclusion reached by Bernard more
than 100 years earlier.
Communication which permits the brain to regulate blood
pressure is at play between the brain and all organ systems
(Figure 1). In particular, the autonomic nervous system exerts
constant, distributed, and calibrated ‘‘accelerator and brake’’
effects, through the sympathetic and parasympathetic divisions
respectively, to orchestrate regulation across organ systems,
and for precision-guided environmental engagement (Rees,
2014). Gross anatomy shows direct autonomic innervation to
the major internal organs, and immune cells too are directly
responsive to parasympathetic signaling (Pavlov and Tracey,
FIGURE 1 | Bidirectional communication exists between the brain and all
other organ systems.
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FIGURE 2 | Overall brain-body relationships as viewed under the paradigm
of allostatic orchestration (PAO). As the organ of central command, the brain
orchestrates operations across systems, for anticipatory regulation of
whole-organism behaviors.
2015). The summed influences of autonomic, neuroendocrine,
and other brain-directed mechanisms including synchronization
between the ‘‘master clock’’ in the suprachiasmatic nucleus
and peripheral clocks throughout the body (Dibner et al.,
2010), call forth Bernard’s statement (Conti, 2002) that
bi-directional communication between the brain and
other systems is the critical organizing principle of human
biology (Figure 2).
Ultimately there are three main reasons to warrant the
demarcation of allostasis as a new paradigm (Kuhn, 1962).
Allostasis explicitly models that parameters will vary for
optimizing interaction with the changing and complex variables
of the natural environment, whereas homeostasis looks for the
factors that maintain parameter constancy, typically within
the context of a controlled laboratory setting; it explains that
successful biological regulation takes place on an anticipatory
basis, whereas homeostasis generally explains biological
regulation on the basis of corrective or reactive feedback; and
allostasis points to the role of the brain as the organ of central
command, whereas homeostasis may or may not include the
complexities of neural regulation as formal variables within
the experimental frame. As emphasized throughout this essay,
these distinctions point to different categories of data of interest,
different model problems, and different model solutions.
Propositions of the PAO
To formalize its recognition that brain-body relationships are the
rule and not the exception, the PAO applies the nomenclature of
FIGURE 3 | Allostatic state, representing the totality of integrated brain-body
interactions. Each system’s behavior is a facet of the unitary state.
an allostatic state to refer to the integrated totality of interactions
between the brain and all organ systems (Figure 3). Notably
and as explored further below and in Section ‘‘Conciliation of
the Two Paradigms,’’ this definition for an ‘‘allostatic state’’
differs from that given by other investigators (e.g., Koob
and Le Moal, 2001, and see Table 1). The expression of
neurally-regulated functioning within a given system can be
conceptualized as a facet of an allostatic state. White coat
hypertension (Pickering et al., 1988), for example, may be
understood as the cardiovascular facet of the allostatic state
of anxiety, among selected individuals when they are in the
presence of a medical authority figure. Other examples of
findings or symptoms associated with allostatic state facets,
that are typically associated with environmental, social, or
perceived stressors, include irritable bowel syndrome (e.g., Mayer
et al., 2001), reproductive disturbance (e.g., Rooney and Domar,
2018), bronchospasm (e.g., Rosenberg et al., 2014), immune
dysregulation (Glaser and Kiecolt-Glaser, 2005), chronic pain
(e.g., Burke et al., 2017), and addictive behaviors (e.g., Koob
and Schulkin, 2018). Importantly, the PAO’s conception of the
allostatic state does not apply to pathology alone, nor does it
imply that neural effects (or stressors) are the sole cause of
any disorder; rather it serves to remind that there is always
bidirectional influence between any given system expression and
the functioning of the brain.
A second new concept of the PAO is optimal anticipatory
oscillation, introduced as a way to help spark new thinking and
scientific imagination for the operationalization of health. The
concept is effectively the same as Sterling’s definition of health
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as ‘‘optimal predictive fluctuation’’ (2004), which can replace the
idea that health is a capacity for reactive (or corrective) feedback.
Optimal anticipatory oscillation builds on appreciation of the
brain as a ‘‘prediction machine’’ (e.g., Engel et al., 2001; Buzsaki,
2006), and reflects the capacity for matching between operations
in the individual with the typically oscillatory features of the
environment, in ways that reduce limitations, enhance resilience,
or expand the range of possible functionalities or opportunities.
In the cardiovascular facet, for example, optimal anticipatory
oscillation may be demonstrated as patterns of variability in
heart rate, indicating a capacity for rapid recalibrations of cardiac
output in context-sensitive ways, that confers a decreased risk
of morbidity or mortality (Kleiger et al., 1987; Dekker et al.,
1997). The behavioral facet of optimal anticipatory oscillation
may be associated with characteristic sleep patterns (Buysse,
2014), motor behaviors or sensory acuity (McClintock et al.,
2016), or positive cognitive appraisals (e.g., Kalisch et al., 2015).
Optimal anticipatory oscillation to affect the facet of immunity
is shown in a study of meditation combined with breath training
and cold temperature exposure (Kox et al., 2014), that entailed
the anticipatory tuning of cognitive appraisals and breathing
cycles. Characterization of the allostatic state facets of optimal
anticipatory oscillation—positive health across organ systems, to
reduce the prevalence and incidence of morbidity, and confer
resilience—is a ripe area for future research. In a sense, the
agenda aims to bring tractability to the definition for health—a
‘‘state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being, and
not merely the absence of disease’’—given by the World Health
Organization (1948) after World War II.
Integration of the above concepts permits a formal way to
recognize and elucidate heterogeneity in phenotypes of health
or disease. The PAO postulates a range of allostatic states,
characterized by different tendencies for demonstrating optimal
anticipatory oscillation. At one end, allostatic states of optimality
indicate a dynamic capacity for recalibration that is generally
associated with positive mental and physical health. At the
other end, allostatic states of impairment indicate rigidification
in operational set points, and they manifest as conditions
of behavioral and physical disease. Between optimality and
impairment, there is a spectrum of states associated with
varying kinds and degrees of functionality. The multiplicity
of disturbances represented in allostatic state facets is a
prediction confirmed in the empirical finding that comorbidity
(the presence of more than one disorder) is the rule among
individuals with chronic diseases (Wolff et al., 2002).
If optimal anticipatory oscillation is a way to operationalize
health, the question still remains as to what might be the cause
for this capacity. Whereas homeostasis loosely conceptualizes
the cause of health as an ‘‘absence of abnormality in the factors
of homeostasis,’’ the PAO’s attention to anticipatory regulation
invokes as the cause of health that state of the brain (being the
site of central command) that is most conducive to the generation
of rapid and context-sensitive variations in its activity. A given
brain activity pattern can only be characterized as ‘‘optimal’’ for
a given environmental condition; it is the pluripotent capacity
to express a range of activity patterns, that should be the most
optimal pattern of all. An ‘‘empty’’ state of latent potentiality
may have great import for anticipatory regulation, when external
circumstances entail unpredictable and last-moment changes
(up to and including ‘‘black swan’’ events; Taleb, 2007); such a
state would serve as an ‘‘information reservoir’’ for yielding a
repertoire of different behaviors, including entirely new ones. A
hypothesis of the PAO is that increasingly optimal anticipatory
oscillation—or the capacity for expressing context-sensitive and
heterogeneous phenotypes of ‘‘health’’—is a function of the
brain’s proximity to the state of criticality (Beggs and Timme,
2012; Shew and Plenz, 2013; Cocchi et al., 2017). ‘‘Criticality’’
(in statistical physics, and in the PAO) refers to the point of
mathematical balance between phases of a complex system, or
a state of poise on the border between order and disorder,
also described as the ‘‘edge of chaos.’’ Cortical functioning at
criticality appears to permit optimizations of dynamic range
(ability to respond to stimuli that are of many different
sizes), fidelity of information transmission, and information
capacity (Shew and Plenz, 2013). The potential relationship
between cortical criticality and optimal anticipatory oscillation
is presented in Figure 4. The theorized value of allostatic
state criticality is further highlighted through depiction that
the relationship between criticality and optimal anticipatory
oscillation may be non-linear, given that as with other complex
systems, many functions of the brain are likely to operate
on the basis of power laws (e.g., Thiel, 2014; Bettinger, 2017;
Kasagi et al., 2017).
As to the genesis and perpetuation of different states, the PAO
hypothesizes that downward drift toward allostatic impairment is
likely to be associated with chronic stress or trauma. Allostatic
load, which is used to describe the condition where acutely
valuable stress mediators have crossed a threshold—because of
stress chronicity—leading to the production of tissue damage
(McEwen and Stellar, 1993; McEwen, 1998), can be understood
as one type of allostatic impairment. Long-term exposure
to catabolic hormones and other stress-related mediators
(glucocorticoids, sympathetic neurotransmitters, inflammatory
cytokines) may lead to hypertension, hyperlipidemia, glucose
intolerance, visceral obesity, and other diseases of ‘‘chronic
stress’’ (Seeman et al., 2010). A midway point in this process,
when stress has been chronic if not yet established as ‘‘full-
blown’’ allostatic load, has been labeled as the ‘‘allostatic
state’’ by Koob and Le Moal (2001), and it seems tenable
that the Koob-Le Moal conception might instead be given
the label of allostatic strain. Allostatic impairment may also
occur on time scales longer than individual life spans, in
that for example, many chronic diseases can be attributed to
the persistence of evolutionarily ancient biological pathways
(Lee et al., 2004; Yun et al., 2004; Goldman, 2015). While
vasoconstriction, inflammation and thrombosis are critical
responses for physical traumas that penetrate beyond the
epidermis and thereby produce risks for exsanguination
and potentially pathogenic microbe exposure, these same
pathways are also likely to produce ‘‘diseases of modernity’’
when they are repeatedly activated as a consequence of
perceived, social or other ‘‘non-physical’’ stressors (Sapolsky,
2004). In the other direction, elucidation of mechanisms for
upward drift (toward allostatic optimality) is a bright area
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FIGURE 4 | Hypothesized relationship between an allostatic state’s proximity to the state of criticality (mathematical balance, between phases, on the border
between order and disorder), and its tendency to demonstrate optimal anticipatory oscillation. The function is proposed to be non-linear in concordance with the
likely presence of power laws.
for future research, at both individual and population or
species levels.
To summarize the preceding ideas, propositions of the PAO
are presented as follows.
1. Change itself is the norm of nature, and the natural
environment is complex. Realistic modeling to explain
whole-organism behavior requires systematic attention to
environmental complexity.
2. The complexity of the brain permits optimized forms
of engagement with environmental complexity, including
anticipatory regulation. The brain is a complex organ that
serves as central command for the organism as a whole,
to permit context-sensitive orchestrations of cross-system
operations and parameter variations.
3. Brain-body communication is the rule, not the exception.
Physiological mechanisms can be modeled as the integrated
totality of brain-body interactions, or the allostatic state, with
different system functionalities being explicable as different
facets of the overall state.
4. Healthiness and diseases can be conceptualized non-
categorically, as a heterogeneity of phenotypes that exist along
a continuum between allostatic optimality and impairment.
Health itself can be defined as optimal anticipatory oscillation,
which refers to flexible and successful interactions with the
complex and changing environment; diseases can be defined
as the rigid persistence of context-insensitive operational
set points.
5. Healthiness, disease, and other demonstrations of anticipatory
oscillation (or its impairment) are themselves secondary
phenomena, which invoke the need for investigation of primary
causes. Tendency to maintain the state of criticality (a point
of mathematical poise between phases, on the border between
order and disorder) is hypothesized to explain the likelihood
to express optimal anticipatory oscillations.
Conciliation of the Two Paradigms
As noted in Section ‘‘Allostasis—From Principles to Paradigm,’’
the current presentation aims to help resolve the question of
whether allostasis (to include the PAO) is genuinely different
from homeostasis. Attention to this question entails empirical,
analytical, inferential, interventional, and ethical considerations,
some of which are further explored in Section ‘‘Selected
Considerations and Summary.’’ Clarification of terminology
shared by the two paradigms, as put forth by different authors,
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is presented in Table 1. A listing of selected properties of both
paradigms, to include ways that the PAO differs from yet can be
conciliated with homeostasis, is contained in Table 2.
Sterling (2004) has contended that allostasis is necessary
to replace the concept of homeostasis, which is itself flawed.
In this view, homeostasis erroneously perceives that biological
parameters maintain a categorically constant set point (they
do not), and erroneously explains that these set points are
maintained through corrective or reactive feedback (which
is inconsistent with the ubiquity of anticipatory regulatory
behaviors demonstrated throughout nature). It is the brain that
acts as a data-integrating prediction-machine, to orchestrate
operational set points and anticipatory behaviors in ways
that support whole-organism health (with implications for
species evolution). In the main, critics of Sterling’s original
allostasis concept have focused on his point against biological
constancy, and dismissed it as a mischaracterization of the
thinking of Bernard and Cannon, who both recognized
variability of biological functions. Consequently, there
have been doubts as to whether the allostasis concept
adds meaning beyond homeostasis (Dallman, 2003; Day,
2005). In contrast, there is little disagreement that the brain
TABLE 2 | Selected properties of the paradigm of homeostasis and the paradigm of allostatic orchestration (PAO).
Homeostasis PAO
Core concept Stability through constancy (or similitude) Stability through change (resembles “constancy” when
product of neural and environmental complexities is
minimized)
Emergence in the history of biology Originally motivated to apply nineteenth century
physico-chemical insights toward reductionistic
understanding of life processes; procedures of
the laboratory established prior to Darwin
Motivated by naturalistic observations including the
influence of large-scale environmental variables, as well
as the “prediction-machine” integrative role of the brain
for navigation of complex and changing environments;
informed by a post-Darwinian evolutionary perspective;
principles of physics and chemistry still apply
Experimental frame Laboratory, controlled conditions Open contexts and changing conditions, which may mimic
the laboratory under rare circumstances
Primary variables of interest, and regulatory model Genes and molecules; interactions occur on the
basis of corrective feedback
Parameters of complexity pertaining to neural function and
the environmental context, as well as mediator pathways;
interactions occur on the basis of anticipatory behavior
Principle mode of causal inference Molecular interactions determine phenomena at
higher levels of observation (“bottom up”
explanations)
Phenomena at higher levels of observation including
neocortical activity and environmental factors may cause or
correlate with phenomena at lower levels of observation
(explanation based on “top-down” or bidirectional
influences)
Status of the brain One organ among others One organ among others, yet also the central and
integrative site of information processing for all organs
and behaviors
Definition of health Absence of disease Optimal anticipatory oscillation for complex and changing
environments (context-sensitive phenotypic heterogeneity),
theorized to be a function of system criticality
Explanation for pathology Production of categorically dysfunctional
molecular interactions
Persistence of molecular interactions that are not beneficial
for a given context, in association with neurally-directed
rigidification of oscillatory patterns
View of disease comorbidity Not emphasized, due to focus on
system-specific mechanisms
Predicted, because of cross-system effects orchestrated at
the level of the brain
View of “normal” biology Based on statistical modeling, including
population averages
None; all biological function is context-sensitive, and no
context can be deemed “normal” in an absolute sense
Approach to therapeutics Modification of specific mechanisms deemed to
be “abnormal” or otherwise dysfunctional
Specific mechanisms may be modified or clamped to
stabilize a highly disorganized system; full healing depends
on facilitation of the brain’s endogenous orchestrative
capacities, and modification of influences from the natural
environment
View of free will and consciousness Free will is a “user illusion” even in the healthy,
since “consciousness” is an epiphenomenal
product of determined, molecular processes
Free will and consciousness are “real” phenomena that
have causal top-down efficacy for influencing lower levels
of biology, even as they are correlated with molecular
processes and may be compromised due to neural
dysregulation
Derivation and substance of ethical considerations Liberal political philosophy from the
Enlightenment through the twentieth century
generates ethical principles of autonomy,
non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice;
there is a need to avoid the naturalistic fallacy
(“because it’s seen in nature, humans should do
it too”)
Conventional biomedical ethics are upheld, even as new
thinking in neuroethics presents the “augmented” principles
of self-creativity, non-obsolescence, empowerment, and
citizenship; neuroethics further integrates new scientific
insights around brain function, with (potentially) technology-
aided advancements in brain function; human freedom
itself may be reconceptualized or experienced in new ways;
there remains a need to avoid the naturalistic fallacy
Scientific approach Linear models Complexity, criticality, non-linear models
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produces anticipatory behaviors, and increasingly researchers
distinguish between ‘‘reactive homeostasis’’ and ‘‘predictive
homeostasis’’ (e.g., Romero et al., 2009; Riede et al., 2017;
Cardinali, 2018).
As stated from the outset of this essay, the PAO begins on
the foundation of Sterling’s critique of the conceptions, data
sets, typical modes of inference, and therapeutic concomitants
(and limitations) of physiological research post-Cannon.
Though Cannon made many statements which can be
selectively highlighted to give the appearance that Sterling
has misunderstood him (and Bernard’s appreciation for the
brain has been unrecognized by many), a bird’s-eye view of
homeostatic science makes clear that it is generally designed for
the isolation of local factors, in hopes for discovery of ‘‘silver
bullets’’—with sparse attention to complex environments which
will favor anticipatory variations in functional set points, or
to the integrative and top-down role of the brain. The only
way to validate the existence and efficacy of such bullets is to
‘‘factor out’’ the contributions of top-down neural regulation
(e.g., the placebo effect) and environmental variations. Sterling
can be forgiven for using Bernard and Cannon as straw-men
in order to make a set of crucial points that have still yet
to reach biomedical researchers as a community. There are
vacuities in research which proceeds without a view informed
by evolutionary processes (‘‘the homeostasis model is essentially
pre-Darwinian’’; Sterling, 2012), the role of the brain as a
prediction-machine, and consciousness itself.
Subsequent to Sterling, it is the McEwen view of allostasis
(e.g., McEwen and Stellar, 1993; McEwen and Wingfield,
2003), that has been championed, gained currency, and been
subject to its own criticism. In this formulation, homeostasis is
defined as ‘‘stability of the physiological systems that maintain
life,’’ and is taken to refer specifically to a few fundamental
parameters including core temperature, pH, glucose level, and
oxygen tension that are preserved within a relatively narrow
range. Allostasis is defined as ‘‘stability through change,’’ or a
process that supports homeostasis, and it encompasses a broader
array of variations in activity patterns, for neuroendocrine
hormones, cytokines, and other mediators, under conditions
of acute stress. One critic of this ‘‘two-construct’’ perspective
contends that it is founded on conceptual ambiguities, in
that homeostasis should be conceptualized as a state (not a
process), and that processes which support homeostasis can
simply be labeled as ‘‘homeostatic mechanisms’’ (Day, 2005).
A different critic has pointed out that alterations in hormonal
secretions and other pathways are also fundamental to life
(Dallman, 2003), such that a functional distinction between
homeostasis and allostasis is untenable. Notably, the second
criticism opens the door for Sterling’s more radical view—if
all parameter maintenance in living systems can be traced to
the support for life, then perhaps it is ‘‘homeostasis’’ that is
rendered redundant. Moreover, parameter variabilities seem to
be more a matter of degree than of kind. Acid-base balance,
glucose, and oxygen tension also vary non-trivially depending
on environmental factors including context-sensitive physical
exertion, threat perception, altitude, nutritional status, and
others. Even human body temperature appears to shift (if almost
imperceptibly) in response to environmental factors (Cisse et al.,
1991; Lui et al., 2014).
Nonetheless and conceivably, if the sciences which explore
homeostasis—the collective methodologies essential to the
maintenance and utility of a Kuhnian paradigm—were
sufficiently broadened or revised, there would be no need
to burden biological researchers with the additional concept
of allostasis. The necessity of ‘‘Sterling allostasis’’ (or the
PAO) arises because data collection and causal inference in
biology are substantially still driven by a methodology that
systematically limits or ignores parameter alteration or variability
that may be decisively influenced by factors from complex
environments, as well as neural complexity including top-down
efficacy for regulation of whole-body physiology (especially
in higher vertebrates). Adequate updating of the classical
view of homeostasis would entail the need for three formal
revisions. Again, there would be a need for formal recognition
of anticipatory behaviors (e.g., more recognition of ‘‘predictive’’
homeostasis). Second, there is a need for formal attention to
top-down neural effects and their complexity (again considering
that despite Cannon’s many studies of the brain, his focus was on
the local ‘‘factors’’ of regulation, epitomized by the rubric of the
wisdom of the body). Third, there is a need for an expansion in
formal modeling of the complexity of the natural environment.
Thus, the PAO begins with two critical complexities that
are foundations, not after-thoughts, and that are themselves
interfaced through anticipatory regulation; and it avoids the
possible introduction of ‘‘kludges’’ to rescue homeostasis. The
PAO’s potential to resolve ‘‘reactive vs. predictive homeostasis’’
may be one illustration of its economy, in that it identifies
‘‘reactive homeostasis’’ as a kind of illusion. What appears to
be a reactive (or ‘‘corrective’’) process may be parsimoniously
understood as another form of anticipatory behavior, if
the complex environment has been ‘‘controlled’’ to appear
monotonous and unchanging, and especially if neural regulation
is relatively limited in its own complexity or criticality.
An additional implication of conciliation is to offer lines
of exploratory investigation for any given phenomenon that
appears to be homeostatic. The PAO predicts that relative
constancy in any biological parameter will yield to findings
of increased variability if there are systematic alterations
in either the complexity of neural dynamics (including the
proximity to critical states), environmental complexity, or both.
A straightforward illustration is to consider a subject who
provides continuous daytime blood pressure readings for 10
consecutive days. He or she may showmaintenance of an average
(and ‘‘normal’’) blood pressure in the vicinity of 120/80 for
each day, irrespective of occasional changes from being seated
to standing, or whether they read the morning newspaper or
receive an animated neighbor as a guest. Consistency of the mean
value at roughly 120/80 for each of those 10 days can be taken
as empirical evidence for homeostasis. However if 10 days of
readings were then to be collected from the same subject after
they had begun a new role associated with high job strain (high
demands with little autonomy, e.g., Landsbergis et al., 2013),
or if new readings were collected under conditions of unusual
variability of weather (e.g., high air mass, Morabito et al., 2008),
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then the data might contrast with the earlier experiment (that
was ‘‘behaviorally and environmentally controlled’’). The latter
data sets might not suggest the homeostatic findings shown
over the first 10 days, and they might show oscillations between
alternative set points, consistent with propositions of the PAO.
The crux of the investigational difference between the paradigms,
is that if either of the second sets of findings were demonstrated
with a different subject, the homeostatic paradigm would guide
the researcher to search for differences in their local factors
(i.e., differences in their genes or their expression, in today’s
laboratories), whereas while the PAO would also be sensitive to
genetic substrates, it would search for differences in environmental
and top-down neural regulatory influences.
Following is a more provocative example of how homeostatic
phenomena can be viewed as the special case of allostatic
orchestrations that arise when a product of neural and
environmental complexities is minimized. The constancy of
core body temperature in homeotherms, despite major changes
in seasonal weather, seems to give evidence for the McEwen-
Wingfield formulation that homeostasis is the rule for a few
fundamental parameters. Yet perhaps the narrow range is only a
demonstration of relatively limited critical capacity for top-down
neural regulation of temperature. Many mammal species reduce
their core temperatures markedly during winter (i.e., they
hibernate), at a time when their foraging opportunities are
limited. Interestingly the evolutionary origins of hibernation are
not genetically defined (Srere et al., 1992); there are different
lineages that contain both hibernators and non-hibernators
(suggesting that the trait has apparently been either gained
or lost multiple times in evolution, without a ‘‘gene for
hibernation’’), pointing to differential patterns of gene expression
or epigenetic processes (Morin and Storey, 2009). That humans
do not hibernate can be interpreted as our own limitation in
critical neural dynamics for temperature regulation, and the
notion serves to remind that neural complexity should not
be misunderstood to mean (or be conflated with) ‘‘cognitive
intelligence for abstract or symbolic information processing.’’
With our species humility thus expressed, it also bears noting
that human hibernation induction is being studied as a
future therapy for preventing tissue ischemia (Lee, 2008) and
also as a potential strategy for interplanetary space travel
(Gemignani et al., 2015).
To recapitulate, the PAO models biological operations
in a way that expressly incorporates the complexity of the
natural environment, the complexity of neural regulation as
the organism’s ‘‘tool’’ for navigation within that environment,
and anticipatory regulation as the process for interaction
between the organism and its environment. As final granular
examples of distinctions between the lines of research they
motivate, the following are titles of hypothetical studies on
glucose regulation. Elucidation of fine molecular factors may
continue through a study such as, for example, ‘‘Aberrant
expression of HMSTS disrupts glucose homeostasis through
protease-mediated degradation of key receptor in obese mice.’’
Such studies may nonetheless still be more formally expressive
about their limits and may do more to consider hidden
variables in the environment or neural regulation, including
animal handling patterns or even differences in the ‘‘lifestyles’’
of murine subjects. The PAO might inspire a report on
‘‘Stratification in frequency domain analysis of ecologically
monitored glucose allostasis identifies new potential risk
factors for pre-diabetes’’ (attention to context-dependence of
physiological variability, focused on oscillatory properties of
parameter estimates, for early disease prevention); or ‘‘Alteration
in pre-prandial glucose allostasis through a comprehensive
lifestyle intervention’’ (attention to anticipatory regulation
and whole-person behavior); or ‘‘Allostatic intervention for
critical brain dynamics in diabetics results in tighter glucose
control without increasing episodes of hypoglycemia’’ (strategic
promotion of agility for variation in allostatic states, for neurally-
directed orchestrations of context-specific hormone levels).
Figure 5 illustrates the mapping of studies along axes of
variable attention to complexities in the natural environment
and in top-down neural regulation and includes a category
of research—studies that explicitly attend to complexities in
both the environment and neural regulation—that as yet is
largely nascent.
At this juncture it may also be helpful to identify socio-
cultural and ethical currents as well as a key lacuna of scientific
understanding—the physics of consciousness itself—which have
likely contributed to the value and durability of the homeostatic
paradigm, and may be presumed to associate with any
application of the PAO (see also ‘‘Selected Considerations
and Summary’’ section). Theological dictums have influenced
progress in biology (for example in Descartes’ postulation of
a dualistic reality that gave the church the province of the
mind, and natural philosophers—scientists—the province of
the body) no less than they have in physics. Separately yet
relatedly, physicians and healers judiciously rely on the biological
value of their patients’ subjective confidence. Bernard and
Cannon formalized an experimental method explicitly designed
to ascertain material causes and effects in living systems,
without adducing idiosyncratic or sometimes exploitative ideas
and practices of theologians, vitalists, physicians, or faith
healers. These two giants of physiology are in a lineage
that extends the legacy of the American polymath Benjamin
Franklin one century and more before them, with respect
to Franklin’s participation in a commission that falsified
the ‘‘magnetism’’ claims of Franz Mesmer. It seems possible
that Cannon’s own relative neglect of the brain’s top-down
influences may have been partly motivated by his own principled
ethical secularism (he was raised as a Unitarian Christian,
and involved in numerous international political movements).
Ethical secularism remains alive and well, easily recognizable
in the commitments to liberal political philosophy dating
back to the Western Enlightenment (e.g., the writings of
John Locke, not modern partisan ‘‘liberalism’’) which are
central to modern biomedical ethics. Stated otherwise, modern
biomedicine at its best may shun the benefits of the placebo
response not out of antipathy to human self-empowerment,
rather because it greater disdains the sense of charlatanism
(or religious parochialism) that can sometimes be associated
with its efficacious induction, and the distaste is exacerbated
by the lack of a hold on the essential biology of subjective
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FIGURE 5 | Research designs can be mapped along the degrees to which they admit complexity in the environment and top-down neural regulation. Confidence in
the generalizability of findings from a given study, for applicability toward humans in their natural environment, depends on exceeding a threshold for recognizing both
kinds of complexity (transition from the bench, to the “real” world).
intentionality. The objectivity of the laboratory has not only
identified the fine mediators of biological operations, it has
also been constitutive for the needful expunging of ‘‘sin’’ in
particular as an etiological construct in the understanding of
health and disease.
Nonetheless and with appreciation for the weight of the
aforementioned considerations, including the cost of progress
and the work still undone, the thrust of the PAO is that the
present need for advancements in neuroscience, healthcare,
and beyond, points us to cease clinging to an era where the
significance of subjectivity, or consciousness itself, is ignored
in neural research or excluded with scrupulosity from the
healthcare toolkit. To be clear, the PAOmakes no call for a return
to vitalistic reasoning, disease as ‘‘punishment,’’ or the methods
ofMesmer. As the PAO admits consciousness and all its qualities,
the ‘‘old’’ scientific conundrums and ethical dilemmas will not
disappear; they will require advanced forms of conceptualization
and engagement.
SELECTED CONSIDERATIONS AND
SUMMARY
Implications of the Two Paradigms for
Intervention on the Brain
Innovation is needed in the field of brain functional
enhancement or advancement, that begins and ends with a
homeostatic perspective. For example, a neuroprosthetic is
a miracle if it permits recovery of homeostatic capacities for
an individual with gross brain damage. Nonetheless even the
most successful homeostatic interventions may entail systematic
under-recognition of unintended consequences, because such
effects may not be easily visible in the controlled context of
early laboratory investigations. In contrast, the PAO perspective
may be well suited to inform brain advancement objectives on
larger scales, with heterogeneous populations, for objectives
that may be less ‘‘controlling’’ yet potentially more ambitious.
To clarify the differences entailed by homeostatic and PAO
approaches to brain advancement, this section begins by
considering how homeostasis and the PAO are associated with
different approaches to ‘‘brain normality’’ and therapeutics
in general.
Homeostasis begins with the (often unstated) presumption
that there do exist ‘‘truly normal’’ forms of biological
phenomena including brain functionality; that ‘‘true and discrete
abnormalities’’ can be identified; and that the goal of therapeutics
including brain-focused interventions is to ‘‘restore the state
of normality.’’ While scientists acknowledge that the parameter
estimates associated with these assumptions may be frail, there
is little argument about the biological validity of the constructs
themselves (normality, abnormality, and correction), and indeed
without them, it is not clear how knowledge can be gained, or
interventions can be devised. In contrast, the PAO definition
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of health as an active state of anticipatory behaviors with
respect to the changing environment is not consistent with
the identification of a single biological state that is objectively
‘‘normal.’’ An ‘‘average’’ specimen may be the one that is
obliterated, in the next new environment; it may be the highly
‘‘unusual’’ individual that becomes the ‘‘next new normal’’
(Taleb, 2007, 2012). Moreover, free human beings make choices
which produce compounding effects (in conjunction with
differences in genetic expression and environmental exposures),
eventuating in different states of brain, health, and life—which
will continue to change over time. It is hardly obvious that
universal criteria can exist for demarcating categorical thresholds
of normality or pathology, in space or time.
Of note, homeostatic thinking may be the default mode of
understanding even for some researchers who have embraced
some concepts related to allostasis or allostatic load. Though it is
possible to identify a wide array of mediators of top-down neural
effects, it does not necessarily follow that intervention on one of
those mediators represents a form of ‘‘allostatic therapy.’’ Rather
it is attention to the brain’s unique and changing dynamics
per se, to include its association with whole-organism behaviors
in context, that is central to the Sterling principle of allostasis
or the PAO. For example, many pharmacological strategies
that are designed to clamp set points for neurotransmission,
even if they ‘‘target allostatic load,’’ are still likely to entail
the complications and limitations associated with homeostatic
therapeutics (Sterling, 2004).
Broadly speaking, there are three general categories of
interventional strategies that represent model solutions within
the PAO. Beginning with the environmental context that first
inspired his insights, Sterling (2004) has proposed that since
social disruption is the ultimate cause for the brain to predict a
need for elevated arousal, then it is repair of the social fabric that
is ultimately necessary for the brain to revise its prediction and
thereby re-orchestrate its downstream regulation. This category
need not be limited to social factors (or political engagements)
and can certainly include the built environment. Ulrich (1984)
reported over 30 years ago that among patients hospitalized
for cholecystectomy, those whose windows faced a natural
setting had shorter stays than those who faced a brick wall,
and today there are multi-stakeholder initiatives to imagine and
build our surroundings in ways that are consistent with health
promotion (Trowbridge et al., 2016). One hopes that architects
and others may pay increasing attention to allostatic health not
only in hospitals, also in urban planning and the design—and
construction process—of educational structures, commercial and
civic facilities, public housing, correctional institutions, and
other locations where people spend hours, days, or years of
their lives. Second and at the level of behaviors, the PAO
points to the value of mental training, physical exercise, yoga,
and related strategies, for their potential to support attenuation
of elevated set points for the stress response system (e.g.,
Streeter et al., 2012; Pau et al., 2016). A third category entails a
direct focus on the brain itself, for example through devices or
other tools designed to support optimality of complex system
dynamics (e.g., Lee et al., 2019) including the state of criticality
(e.g., Ros et al., 2016).
Allostatic innovations across categories may be supported by
imagination and new thinking from behavioral medicine
specialists, mathematicians, primary care physicians,
physicists, architects, urban planners, anthropologists,
health system leaders, technology entrepreneurs, artists,
epidemiologists, nutritionists, pharmacologists, yogis,
self-empowerment gurus, and others. Whatever their character
or provenance, allostatic strategies are likely to align with
the non-linear sciences of complexity, and they may show
that even subtle forms of well-placed intervention can have
compounded consequences.
Brain-focused interventionalists should classify their
approaches as being homeostatic or allostatic. Classification
can occur by determining whether the objective is to ‘‘push’’
or clamp the brain toward a specific output parameter (e.g.,
alteration of mood, memory, performance metric, etc.), or to
support the brain to move toward a pluripotent and flexible
capacity for meeting the needs of changing situations. Allostatic
intervention may still include the goal of ‘‘improvement’’
for a given output parameter, yet strictly speaking, such a
change should be modeled as a secondary outcome (given its
contingency on assumptions about the ‘‘better’’ which may or
may not be durable). Whereas a homeostatic medication for
sleep promotion may also cause lethargy that impairs attention,
in contrast an allostatic intervention should support a state of
‘‘wholeness’’ that can be expressed as relaxation or concentration,
depending on the contextual need. Moreover, robust allostatic
interventions should have effects on bodily facets of the allostatic
state, not only on cognitions, emotions or behaviors.
Criticality as a Vehicle for Evolutionary
Processes
Although the PAO arises from an evolutionary perspective,
it does not adduce the ideas of adaptation or natural
selection. Whereas a modern and molecular view of an
adaptation conceives it as a genetic (hard-wired) variation,
‘‘field-tested’’ over repeated reproductive cycles that ‘‘judge’’
its fitness for a given environment (e.g., Dawkins, 1976),
optimal anticipatory oscillation is the flexible, instantaneous,
and iterated orchestration of multiple mechanisms across
systems, to permit dynamic interaction with nature, when
brain and environment are both changing at time cycles
much faster than intergenerational gene transfer. Popper
(1978) pointed out that many usages of natural selection
are tautological—we know that some variants are more fit
because they have survived; what permits some variants
to survive, is being more fit. The PAO theorizes that
the critical state of the brain (or critical states of proto-
neural or neuro-analogous structures in organisms without
brains), demonstrated behaviorally as optimality of anticipatory
oscillation (or as ‘‘information-based fitness’’ within a general
mathematical framework, e.g., Hidalgo et al., 2014), may serve
as a general vehicle for evolutionary processes. Depending
on the availability of genetic substrates and in association
with other factors, the state of criticality may produce a
variety of phenomena including differential reproductive success
under conditions of resource scarcity (‘‘natural selection’’),
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sexual selection, altruism or cooperation, beauty as such,
or other phenomena that are emergent or durable over
evolutionary history.
The PAO’s Philosophy of Freedom
Preempts the Naturalistic Fallacy
Historically, early discussion of Darwinian evolutionary theory
was dominated by attacks from theologians, who had held
that creation of life on earth had happened once, perfectly,
without subsequent changes of form. These antagonists did not
easily accept the idea that humans could be physically related
to members of the animal world. Though much antipathy to
evolutionary perspectives may still be the product of ignorance,
there is no question that there are some forms of ‘‘evolutionary
thinking’’ that can also be problematic.
One error perpetuated by some evolutionists is the naturalistic
fallacy (Moore, 1903). For present purposes, the idea is stated as
follows: Whatever the veridicality of scientific principles derived
from observations about the earth’s natural biological past, these
do not compel any form of reasoning or action with respect to
the human present or future. In simpler terms, the idea is no
more complicated than the affirmation that, for example, to
observe an alpha non-human primate maintain troupe stability,
by killing a subordinate ‘‘naturally,’’ does not ‘‘justify’’ a human
being’s decision to behave in a similar ‘‘natural’’ way. Or,
because an evolutionary process associated with struggle has
led to a certain state of outcomes that appear (to some)
to have been desirable, it does not necessarily follow that
struggle should be the guiding principle for producing new
outcomes in the future. Consequences of the naturalistic fallacy
are shown in darker chapters of modern history, post-Origin.
Repressive movements such as eugenics, along with ideologies
that informed twentieth-century fascism, for example, were
products of misconceived justifications based on ‘‘survival of
the fittest.’’
Because allostasis explicitly recognizes the importance of
the brain—and given that the human brain is associated
with an advanced neocortex which supports higher-order
information processing, to include ethical considerations—the
PAO explicitly includes an engagement with questions that
pertain to the nature of the good life. Elsewhere it has been
contended that a new field of allostatic neuro-education can
present many advantages for learners, especially by better
preparing them for the rapidly changing environment of the
twenty-first century (Gerdes et al., 2015). Allostatic neuro-
education is guided by a philosophy of freedom (Steiner,
1894), which holds that the highest good is being free to
live one’s life in a way guided by ethical individualism.
Every new moment presents a new opportunity to make a
new, context-sensitive choice. Ethical individualism requires
the use of the moral imagination and the identification
of options, which in turn depend on the development
of a range of human capacities, the freedom to make
choices among the options, the opportunity to experience
the consequences of those choices, and to repeat. Being
in its essence an approach to the brain which respects
its wide-ranging and complex functionalities, the PAO has
a natural alignment with the philosophy of freedom, and
intuitively it seems plausible that the subjective feeling of
freedom of choice may be the experiential dimension of the
objectively defined state of criticality (Bettinger, 2017). The
PAO further concords with principles of advanced neuroethics
as recently articulated for the new era of self-transformative
technologies (Shook andGiordano, 2016). The PAO is consonant
with greater self-creativity, non-obsolescence, empowerment,
and citizenship, which are intended as ‘‘upgrades’’ for the
traditional concepts of autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence,
and justice, respectively.
The PAO thus preempts or otherwise rejects the naturalistic
fallacy. No understanding of physical law can ‘‘force’’ the making
of a particular human choice. And though there is much
evidence to suggest that ‘‘freedom to choose’’ is a kind of
fictive narrative that emerges in subjective consciousness only
after neuronal processes and ‘‘decisions’’ have already occurred
(e.g., Nørretranders, 1998), it is notable that studies have shown
differences in the ‘‘neurological reality of choice’’ depending
on whether a choice is, effectively, a ‘‘yes’’ or a ‘‘no’’ (Libet,
1999). Differences in the brain’s readiness potential have been
shown depending on whether a subject has been induced to
disbelieve in free will (Rigoni et al., 2011). There is much still
to be learned in this area (Lavazza, 2016). In the interim, the
PAO perspective, as such, has the potential to advance the science
of brain advancement. The PAO illuminates a path to a wider
range of choices, possibilities, and uses of the imagination,
entailed by freedom; with respect to that freedom, it makes
no prescriptions.
A PAO Perspective on PTSD
As noted in Section ‘‘Progress and Limits in the Homeostatic
Understanding of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)’’
there are anomalies that block the advance of understanding
or practice with respect to PTSD, and many of them
can be attributed to competition between foundational
definitions held by different societal stakeholders including
afflicted individuals and their loved ones, clinicians and
healthcare advocates, military culture-bearers, clinical
researchers, laboratory scientists, epidemiologists, and
others. Whether these definitions are constructed upon, or
against, the homeostatic paradigm (and either implicitly
or explicitly), in either case, the persistence of homeostatic
conceptualizations as our dominant ‘‘mental furniture’’ does
not leave researchers or anyone else with much room for
innovation at a fundamental level. Until there is a viable
and attractive framework for biological research other than
homeostasis, in some ways the limitations in scientific
and societal progress around PTSD are predictable. If it
has merit, the PAO should help to honor and integrate
the most valuable elements of different perspectives that
pertain to traumatic stress-related phenomenology, in a
way that goes beyond the political brokering of ontological
consensus, toward the construction of genuine and ‘‘needle-
moving’’ solutions.
In the first place, a strong application of the PAO points us
to dispense with the notion that the clinical construct of PTSD is
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a tenable way to distinguish between ‘‘healthy’’ and ‘‘diseased’’
individuals. As discussed in Section ‘‘Implications of the Two
Paradigms for Intervention on the Brain,’’ it is problematic to
define ‘‘normal’’ biology in any absolute sense, including for
the state of the brain, and a visceral consciousness of this truth
is appreciated greatly in, for example, communities of special
operations military service members. To these individuals on
mission, who have been trained to maintain extraordinary levels
of alertness and sleep deprivation, it is counter-contextual to
state that certain ‘‘symptom criteria’’—including hypervigilance
and sleep disturbance, core features of the clinical PTSD
definition—can be used as indicators of their ‘‘abnormality.’’
Yet in a different setting, neither is it acceptable to suggest
that these traits should have no negative impact on a service
member’s ability to interact with civilians in a non-combat
environment, or that service members should not receive
tailored forms of healthcare or support from the governing
agencies that trained them to develop their characteristics. If
the ‘‘PTSD’’ concept must persist in order to serve civilian
life, then perhaps it is a label that should simply be carried
in a graded form by everyone, anywhere (and perhaps
without the ‘‘D,’’ as some in the military prefer in order
to minimize stigma, e.g., Blais and Renshaw, 2013). As a
matter of self-insight if not clinical care, the PAO points us
to consider that PTS is far more prevalent, or exists along
a far more continuous spectrum than we currently model.
Recognition of a continuum for a trait or functionality is
thematic to the Research Domain Criteria framework of the
National Institutes of Mental Health (Cuthbert and Insel, 2013),
which aims to position behavioral health on a more robust
scientific foundation than the descriptive and label-focused
statistical manuals on which psychiatrists and psychologists
now rely. Importantly, appreciation for a spectrum of states
is not aimed to produce ‘‘disease creep’’ or the medicalization
of everyday life, trends which can be dysfunctional when
they are associated with the limitations and complications of
homeostatic modeling and intervention. From an allostatic
perspective and especially in the current era of accelerating
changes (described as recurrent whiplash by even conservative
commentators), the point is that our species will strain to
thrive in the twenty-first century if we are not conscious of
the character and the effects of acute and chronic stress, if we
are not mature enough to acknowledge these stresses without
blamesmanship, and if we lack efficacious, practical, economical,
ethical, and genuinely healthy strategies for their prevention
or management.
Second, not only is PTS (broadly construed) more endemic
to modern life than homeostatic thinking might point us
to consider (Selye, 1956), the PAO posits that we still have
only a foggy appreciation for the pathways and consequences
of stress effects, or the complexities which influence them.
Chronic assaults on the brain are predicted to have impacts
on all the subsystems which are under the regulation of
central command, even if these influences originate from
mental, social, cultural, or other ‘‘non-physical’’ sources. As
noted in Section ‘‘Progress and Limits in the Homeostatic
Understanding of PTSD,’’ it appears that non-physical factors
such as cognitive appraisals may in some cases play a decisive
role in the expression of behavioral pathology, raising the
question that if free will is real, then what are its definable
limits for producing top-down effects that recover ‘‘healthier’’
neural processes and their physical correlations? While the
jury may still be out on this matter, meanwhile the multiple
disturbances of subjective experience associated with clinical
PTSD including negative cognitions, dysregulations of mood,
and especially poor sleep, in conjunction with its risks for
cardiovascular, metabolic, and other impairments such as
age-related cognitive decline (e.g., Burri et al., 2013; Wang
et al., 2016) should not be dismissed as probable statistical
anomalies (and at an anecdotal level, the author of this
article received an indelible imprint from an individual in her
mid-50s with dementia, residing in an assisted living facility
15 years after being a responder to the 2001 terror attacks
in New York City, where the author was also living at the
time of the attacks; and see Clouston et al., 2016). Ramified
effects from PTS are predicted by the PAO’s proposition that
brain-body communication is the rule and not the exception.
To further explore these relationships, it may be helpful for
researchers to develop and apply new or existing tools for
measuring the neural effects of relatively ‘‘subtle’’ environmental
influences (including but not limited to ‘‘stressors’’), alongside
methodologies for measuring secondary effects on behavioral
tendencies or physical organ function. (Notably, the general
objective of defining and measuring ‘‘stress’’ is a persisting
challenge, e.g., Koolhaas et al., 2011, and beyond the scope
of the present article. A brief orientation, e.g., McEwen, 1998,
reveals that allostatic load can associate with a variety of
allostatic mediator profiles, not only elevation toward a flattened
plateau, also a failure to adapt to repeated hits, or a blunted
response sometimes associated with psychological burn-out. An
effective special forces behavioral medic can discern without
blood testing, when an operator has crossed over to being a
biological ‘‘hot mess,’’ regardless of what that individual may
say about their ‘‘stress’’—and one wonders about the basis for
such insight).
Third, the PAO predicts—and aims to inspire—new
emphases and approaches to PTS(D) management and
prevention, including allostatic interventional strategies
described in Section ‘‘Implications of the Two Paradigms
for Intervention on the Brain.’’ Given the complexities alluded
to in PTS(D) ontology, pathogenesis, and comorbidity, it is
unsurprising that there is no consensus regarding what to
do about PTS(D) on a population basis, whether it can be
prevented and if so then how, and whether efforts toward such
challenges are worth the resources they might require. Though
studies have been conducted on these questions (e.g., Cohen
et al., 2017), it seems that the assumptions and data which
would inform any ‘‘evidence-based’’ modeling of a moonshot to
prevent and eliminate the negative effects of stress, for example,
are likely to be unacceptably fragile or absent. Not only is
the homeostatic evidence for subtle yet chronic stress effects
inadequate for the kinds of conceptualizations entailed by the
PAO, also the scientific appreciation for neural complexity is
still only elementary (including the girders or limits of free
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 16 April 2019 | Volume 13 | Article 129
Lee Paradigm of Allostatic Orchestration
will), and there is a need for advanced allostatic interventional
strategy. Yet we should not be lulled into complacency excused
by the lack of sufficient data collected from existing paradigms.
Homo sapiens currently seem to be on path for exacerbations
(or compounding) of stress effects that are already impairing
our lives in joy and functionality (Harari, 2017). For reasons
outside science, we may be at risk to traverse critical points
of action for advancing human brain functional capacities—to
include upgrades in our capacity to prevent and manage
stress—before we will have established a conservative empirical
consensus about how, precisely, to characterize or measure
these stresses.
Concluding Remarks and Summary
The reflections below aim to further exemplify the potential
usefulness of the PAO with respect to the science of
consciousness, as it pertains to the ‘‘placebo phenomenon,’’ and
the science of human interactions with the global environment,
in the present temporal context. Other implications of ongoing
development and application of the two paradigms and
their interaction with one another are beyond the scope of
this essay.
There are data to indicate that effects from placebo
interventions in clinical trials are increasing over time (e.g.,
Rief et al., 2009; Tuttle et al., 2015), and there is increasing
study to understand placebo components and mechanisms (e.g.,
Schedlowski et al., 2015; Benedetti et al., 2016). While some
interest stems from an allostatic orientation and aligns with a
neuroethics of self-creativity or empowerment, some focus is
strictly homeostatic, aimed to exploit the mediator molecules
of placebo responding, or to eliminate individuals from clinical
trials who appear to possess a genetic profile for such responding
(in their ‘‘placebome’’; Hall et al., 2015). While either increased
homeostatic control of the placebo response—or increased
refinement in its ‘‘out-factoring’’—may support a variety of
objectives, the latter agenda, especially, raises questions for both
science and the neuroethics of non-obsolescence and citizenship.
Is it a good idea, and ethical, for clinical trials to exclude
individuals whose genetics may indicate that they are excellent
placebo responders? For homeostatic science, such individuals
dilute intervention-attributable effects and thereby increase
sample size requirements. Yet placebo responders too pay
taxes and healthcare insurance premiums, and as importantly,
individuals whose consciousness is tuned for perception of
their allostatic state and expression of its facets may show
unanticipated outcomes that point toward alternative uses for an
intervention. The orientation of the PAO is toward inclusion, in
conjunction with a neuroethics that should lead to empowerment
and new forms of insight, not fewer.
Geological data suggest that the earth is now in an
Anthropocene epoch, characterized by human factor influences
more than any other and that in recent decades we are
experiencing a ‘‘Great Acceleration’’ (Lewis and Maslin, 2015).
With increasing effects from climate change, technological
disruptions including artificial intelligence and quantum
computing and others, in conjunction with changing political,
social, economic, and cultural currents, it seems probable that
there are kinds and scales of changes that are still ahead of us.
Yet if it is true that Homo sapiens are now the single largest
influence on the natural environment as a complex whole, then
it is no small matter to state that the essential function of the
brain is to generate optimal anticipatory behaviors with respect
to that self-same environment. The PAO predicts that if human
brains can be successfully supported to be in allostatic states
of criticality, with increased sensitivity to the environment and
human impacts upon it, then they should demonstrate behaviors
that anticipate the value of re-creating those environments so
as to be recursively supportive of their allostatic criticality, the
theorized bedrock of health itself. Allostatic agendas for brain
advancement—to include both an allostatic perspective on the
brain, as well as allostatic interventions—have the potential
to generate virtuous cycles that leverage the inextricability of
humans and their environments.
In the late nineteenth century, Claude Bernard laid the
foundation for the homeostatic paradigm by showing that
biological systems tend to maintain constancy, and Walter
Cannon later used this idea to lead a long prolific run. As
Bernard was concluding that the brain has a privileged position
in its relationship to other organs, Charles Darwin brought
forth a context-sensitive, evolutionary perspective to life on
earth as a whole. Beginning 100 years later, Peter Sterling
and Joseph Eyer re-realized the importance of environmental
context; and they re-realized, with Bernard, that the brain is
the upstream regulator of other organs. To synthesize those
insights, Sterling and Eyer introduced the principle of allostasis,
here expanded upon as the PAO, which posits that neurally
directed anticipatory behavior—not corrective feedback—is the
general principle of biological regulation. The PAO’s construct
of the allostatic state serves to represent the integrated totality
of brain-body interactions, and optimal anticipatory oscillation,
potentially a function of the mathematically-defined state of
criticality, is intended to spur the scientific imagination toward
advancements in models, data, and interventions for positive
health. As an evolutionary approach to brain advancement and
in its alignment with a philosophy of freedom, the PAO aims
to inspire new forms of allostatic thinking, research and action,
including new attention toward currently under-attended classes
of biological phenomena.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
SL is responsible for the ideas presented in this manuscript, and
was the sole writer.
FUNDING
This work was funded in part by the University of Arizona
Libraries Open Access Publishing Fund.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Heaja Kim Lee and Bella Ryan Lee provided critical forms
of support and inspiration while the author was drafting and
revising this essay.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 17 April 2019 | Volume 13 | Article 129
Lee Paradigm of Allostatic Orchestration
REFERENCES
Bai, Z., Chang, J., Chen, C., Li, P., Yang, K., and Chi, I. (2015). Investigating
the effect of transcendental medicine on blood pressure: a systematic
review and meta-analysis. J. Hum. Hypertens. 29, 653–662. doi: 10.1038/jhh.
2015.6
Beggs, J. M., and Timme, N. (2012). Being critical of criticality in the brain. Front.
Physiol. 3:163. doi: 10.3389/fphys.2012.00163
Benedetti, F., Carlino, E., and Piedimonte, A. (2016). Increasing uncertainty in
CNS clinical trials: the role of placebo, nocebo, and Hawthorne effects. Lancet
Neurol. 15, 736–747. doi: 10.1016/s1474-4422(16)00066-1
Benison, S., and Barger, A. C. (2008). ‘‘Cannon, Walter Bradford,’’ in Complete
Dictionary of Scientific Biography, (Vol. 15) eds C. C. Gillispie, F. L. Holmes
and N. Koertge (Detroit: Charles Scribner’s Sons), 71–77.
Beristianos, M. H., Yaffe, K., Cohen, B., and Byers, A. L. (2016). PTSD and risk of
incident cardiovascular disease in aging veterans. Am. J. Geriatr. Psychiatry 24,
192–200. doi: 10.1016/j.jagp.2014.12.003
Bernard, C. (1878). Leçons sur Les Phénomènes de la vie Communs aux Animaux
et aux Végétaux. Paris: Bailliere.
Bettinger, J. S. (2017). Comparative approximations of criticality in a neural
and quantum regime. Prog. Biophys. Mol. Biol. 131, 445–462. doi: 10.1016/j.
pbiomolbio.2017.09.007
Bevan, A. T., Honour, A. J., and Stott, F. H. (1969). Direct arterial pressure
recording in unrestricted man. Clin. Sci. 36, 329–344.
Blais, R. K., and Renshaw, K. D. (2013). Stigma and demographic correlates of
help-seeking intentions in returning service members. J. Trauma. Stress 26,
77–85. doi: 10.1002/jts.21772
Braam, B., Huang, X., Cupples, W. A., and Hamza, S. M. (2017).
Understanding the two faces of low-salt intake. Curr. Hypertens. Rep.
19:49. doi: 10.1007/s11906-017-0744-z
Burke, N. N., Finn, D. P., McGuire, B. E., and Roche, M. (2017). Psychological
stress in early life as a predisposing factor for the development of chronic pain:
clinical and preclinical evidence and neurobiological mechanisms. J. Neurosci.
Res. 95, 1257–1270. doi: 10.1002/jnr.23802
Burri, A., Maercker, A., Krammer, S., and Simmen-Janevska, K. (2013). Childhood
trauma and PTSD symptoms increase the risk of cognitive impairment in a
sample of former indentured child laborers in old age. PLoS One 8:e57826.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0057826
Buysse, D. J. (2014). Sleep health: can we define it? Does it matter? Sleep 37, 9–17.
doi: 10.5665/sleep.3298
Buzsaki, G. (2006). Rhythms of the Brain.New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Cannon,W. B. (1929). Organization for physiological homeostasis. Physiol. Rev. 9,
399–431. doi: 10.1152/physrev.1929.9.3.399
Cardinali, D. P. (2018). ‘‘The timed autonomic nervous system,’’ in Autonomic
Nervous System: Basic and Clinical Aspects, (Cham, Switzerland: Springer),
19–56.
Carretero, O. A., and Oparil, S. (2000). Essential hypertension: part I: definition
and etiology. Circulation 101, 329–335. doi: 10.1161/01.cir.101.3.329
Cisse, F., Martineaud, R., and Martineaud, J. P. (1991). Circadian cycles of central
temperature in hot climate in man. Arch. Int. Physiol. Biochim. Biophys. 99,
155–159. doi: 10.3109/13813459109146956
Clouston, S. A., Kotov, R., Pietrzak, R. H., Luft, B. J., Gonzalez, A., Richards, M.,
et al. (2016). Cognitive impairment among World Trade Center responders:
long-term implications of re-experiencing the 9/11 terrorist attacks.Alzheimers
Dement. 4, 67–75. doi: 10.1016/j.dadm.2016.08.001
Cocchi, L., Gollo, L. L., Zalesky, A., and Breakspear, M. (2017). Criticality in the
brain: a synthesis of neurobiology, models and cognition. Prog. Neurobiol. 158,
132–152. doi: 10.1016/j.pneurobio.2017.07.002
Cohen, G. H., Tamrakar, S., Lowe, S., Sampson, L., Ettman, C., Linas, B.,
et al. (2017). Comparison of simulated treatment and cost-effectiveness of
a stepped care case-finding intervention vs. usual care for posttraumatic
stress disorder after a natural disaster. JAMA Psychiatry 74, 1251–1258.
doi: 10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2017.3037
Conti, F. (2002). Claude Bernard’s Des Fonctions du Cerveau: an ante
litteram manifesto of the neurosciences? Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 3, 979–985.
doi: 10.1038/nrn985
Cooper, S. J. (2008). From Claude Bernard to Walter Cannon. Emergence of the
concept of homeostasis. Appetite 51, 419–427. doi: 10.1016/j.appet.2008.06.005
Cuthbert, B. N., and Insel, T. R. (2013). Toward the future of psychiatric diagnosis:
the seven pillars of RDoC. BMCMed. 11:126. doi: 10.1186/1741-7015-11-126
Dallman, M. F. (2003). Stress by any other name. . .? Horm. Behav. 43, 18–20.
doi: 10.1016/s0018-506x(02)00034-x
Darwin, C. (1859). On the Origins of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or, the
Preservation of the Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. London: J. Murray.
Dawkins, R. (1976). The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Day, T. A. (2005). Defining stress as a prelude to mapping its neurocircuitry:
no help from allostasis. Prog. Neuropsychopharmacol. Biol. Psychiatry 29,
1195–1200. doi: 10.1016/j.pnpbp.2005.08.005
Dekker, J. M., Schouten, E. G., Klootwijk, P., Pool, J., Swenne, C. A., and
Kromhout, D. (1997). Heart rate variability from short electrocardiographic
recordings predicts mortality from all causes in middle-aged and
elderly men: the Zutphen Study. Am. J. Epidemiol. 145, 899–908.
doi: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.aje.a009049
Dibner, C., Schibler, U., and Albrecht, U. (2010). Themammalian circadian timing
system: organization and coordination of central and peripheral clocks. Annu.
Rev. Physiol. 72, 517–549. doi: 10.1146/annurev-physiol-021909-135821
DiNicolantonio, J. J., Mehta, V., and O’Keefe, J. H. (2017). Is salt a culprit or
an innocent bystander in hypertension? A hypothesis challenging the ancient
paradigm. Am. J. Med. 130, 893–899. doi: 10.1016/j.amjmed.2017.03.011
Engel, A. K., Fries, P., and Singer, W. (2001). Dynamic predictions: oscillations
and synchrony in top-down processing. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 2, 704–716.
doi: 10.1038/35094565
Farr, O. M., Ko, B. J., Joung, K. E., Zaichenko, L., Usher, N., Tsoukas, M.,
et al. (2015). Posttraumatic stress disorder, alone or additively with early life
adversity, is associated with obesity and cardiometabolic risk. Nutr. Metab.
Cardiovasc. Dis. 25, 479–488. doi: 10.1016/j.numecd.2015.01.007
Fisher, M. P. (2014). PTSD in the US military and the politics of prevalence. Soc.
Sci. Med. 115, 1–9. doi: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2014.05.051
Gemignani, J., Gheysens, T., and Summerer, L. (2015). ‘‘Beyond astronaut’s
capabilities: the current state of the art,’’ in Proceedings of the 37th Annual
International Conference of the IEEE Engineering in Medicine and Biology
Society (EMBC) (New York, NY: IEEE), 3615–3618.
Gerdes, L., Tegeler, C. H., and Lee, S. W. (2015). A groundwork for allostatic
neuro-education. Front. Psychol. 6:1224. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01224
Glaser, R., and Kiecolt-Glaser, J. K. (2005). Stress-induced immune dysfunction:
implications for health. Nat. Rev. Immunol. 5, 243–251. doi: 10.1038/nri1571
Goldman, L. (2015). Too Much of a Good Thing: How Four Key Survival Traits are
Now Killing Us. New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company.
Graudal, N. A., Hubeck-Graudal, T., and Jurgens, G. (2017). Effects of low
sodium diet versus high sodium diet on blood pressure, renin, aldosterone,
catecholamines, cholesterol, and triglyceride. Cochrane Database Syst. Rev.
4:CD004022. doi: 10.1002/14651858.CD004022.pub4
Grmek, M. D. (2008). ‘‘Bernard, Claude,’’ in Complete Dictionary of Scientific
Biography, (Vol. 2) eds C. C. Gillispie, F. L. Holmes and N. Koertge (Detroit:
Charles Scribner’s Sons), 24–34.
Hall, K. T., Loscalzo, J., and Kaptchuk, T. J. (2015). Genetics and the placebo effect:
the placebome. Trends Mol. Med. 21, 285–294. doi: 10.1016/j.molmed.2015.02.
009
Harari, Y. (2017).HomoDeus: a Brief History of Tomorrow.NewYork, NY: Harper
Collins.
Hidalgo, J., Grilli, J., Suweis, S., Muñoz, M. A., Banavar, J. R., and Maritan, A.
(2014). Information-based fitness and the emergence of criticality in living
systems. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U S A 111, 10095–10100. doi: 10.1073/pnas.
1319166111
Johnson, D. R., Lubin, H., Rosenheck, R., Fontana, A., Sonthwick, S., and
Charney, D. (1997). The impact of the homecoming reception on the
development of posttraumatic stress disorder: the west haven homecoming
stress scale (WHHSS). J. Trauma. Stress 10, 259–277. doi: 10.1002/jts.
2490100207
Kalisch, R., Müller, M. B., and Tüscher, O. (2015). A conceptual framework
for the neurobiological study of resilience. Behav. Brain Sci. 38:e92.
doi: 10.1017/S0140525X1400082X
Kasagi, M., Huang, Z., Narita, K., Shitara, H., Motegi, T., Suzuki, Y., et al. (2017).
Association between scale-free brain dynamics and behavioral performance:
functional MRI study in resting state and face processing task. Behav. Neurol.
2017:2824615. doi: 10.1155/2017/2824615
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 18 April 2019 | Volume 13 | Article 129
Lee Paradigm of Allostatic Orchestration
Kleiger, R. E., Miller, J. P., Bigger, J. T. Jr., and Moss, A. J. (1987). Decreased
heart rate variability and its association with increased mortality after
acute myocardial infarction. Am. J. Cardiol. 59, 256–262. doi: 10.1016/0002-
9149(87)90795-8
Koob, G. F., and Le Moal, M. (2001). Drug addiction, dysregulation of reward,
and allostasis. Neuropsychopharmacology 24, 97–129. doi: 10.1016/s0893-
133x(00)00195-0
Koob, G. F., and Schulkin, J. (2018). Addiction and stress: an allostatic view.
Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2018.09.008 [Epub ahead of
print].
Koolhaas, J. M., Bartolomucci, A., Buwalda, B. D., de Boer, S. F., Flügge, G.,
Korte, S. M., et al. (2011). Stress revisited: a critical evaluation of the stress
concept. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 35, 1291–1301. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.
2011.02.003
Kox, M., van Eijk, L. T., Zwaag, J., van den Wildenberg, J., Sweep, F. C., van der
Hoeven, J. G., et al. (2014). Voluntary activation of the sympathetic nervous
system and attenuation of the innate immune response in humans. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U S A 111, 7379–7384. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1322174111
Kuhn, T. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Landsbergis, P. A., Dobson, M., Koutsouras, G., and Schnall, P. (2013). Job strain
and ambulatory blood pressure: a meta-analysis and systematic review. Am.
J. Public Health 103, e61–e71. doi: 10.2105/ajph.2012.301153
Lavazza, A. (2016). Free will and neuroscience: from explaining freedom away to
new ways of operationalizing and measuring it. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 10:262.
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2016.00262
Lee, C. C. (2008). Is human hibernation possible? Annu. Rev. Med. 59, 177–186.
doi: 10.1146/annurev.med.59.061506.110403
Lee, S. W., Gerdes, L., Tegeler, C. L., Shaltout, H. A., and Tegeler, C. H. (2014).
A bihemispheric autonomic model for traumatic stress effects on health and
behavior. Front. Psychol. 5:843. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00843
Lee, S. W., Laurienti, P. J., Burdette, J. H., Tegeler, C. L., Morgan, A. R.,
Simpson, S. L., et al. (2019). Functional brain network changes following
use of an allostatic, closed-loop, acoustic stimulation neurotechnology for
military-related traumatic stress. J. Neuroimaging 29, 70–78. doi: 10.1111/jon.
12571
Lee, P. Y., Yun, A. J., and Bazar, K. A. (2004). Acute coronary syndromes and
heart failure may reflect maladaptations of trauma physiology that was shaped
during pre-modern evolution. Med. Hypotheses 62, 861–867. doi: 10.1016/j.
mehy.2004.02.004
Lewis, S. L., and Maslin, M. A. (2015). Defining the anthropocene. Nature 519,
171–180. doi: 10.1038/nature14258
Libet, B. (1999). Do we have free will? J. Conscious. Stud. 6, 47–57.
Lui, B., Cuddy, J. S., Hailes, W. S., and Ruby, B. C. (2014). Seasonal
heat acclimatization in wildland firefighters. J. Therm. Biol. 45, 134–140.
doi: 10.1016/j.jtherbio.2014.08.009
Mayer, E. A., Naliboff, B. D., Chang, L., and Coutinho, S. V. (2001). V. Stress
and irritable bowel syndrome. Am. J. Physiol. Gastrointest. Liver Physiol. 280,
G519–G524. doi: 10.1152/ajpgi.2001.280.4.G519
McClintock, M. K., Dale, W., Laumann, E. O., and Waite, L. (2016). Empirical
redefinition of comprehensive health and well-being in the older adults of the
United States. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U S A 113, E3071–E3080. doi: 10.1073/pnas.
1514968113
McEwen, B. S. (1998). Protective and damaging effects of stress mediators.N. Engl.
J. Med. 338, 171–179. doi: 10.1056/NEJM199801153380307
McEwen, B. S., and Stellar, E. (1993). Stress and the individual: mechanisms
leading to disease. Arch. Intern. Med. 153, 2093–2101. doi: 10.1001/archinte.
1993.00410180039004
McEwen, B. S., and Wingfield, J. C. (2003). The concept of allostasis in
biology and biomedicine. Horm. Behav. 43, 2–15. doi: 10.1016/s0018-506x(02)
00024-7
McFarlane, A. C., Lawrence-Wood, E., VanHooff, M.,Malhi, G. S., and Yehuda, R.
(2017). The need to take a staging approach to the biological mechanisms of
PTSD and its treatment. Curr. Psychiatry Rep. 19:10. doi: 10.1007/s11920-017-
0761-2
Moore, G. E. (1903). Principia Ethica. London: Cambridge University Press.
Morabito, M., Crisci, A., Orlandini, S., Maracchi, G., Gensini, G. F., and
Modesti, P. A. (2008). A synoptic approach to weather conditions discloses
a relationship with ambulatory blood pressure in hypertensives. Am.
J. Hypertens. 21, 748–752. doi: 10.1038/ajh.2008.177
Morin, P. Jr., and Storey, K. B. (2009). Mammalian hibernation: differential gene
expression and novel application of epigenetic controls. Int. J. Dev. Biol. 53,
433–442. doi: 10.1387/ijdb.082643pm
Najavits, L. M. (2015). The problem of dropout from ‘‘gold standard’’ PTSD
therapies. F1000Prime Rep. 7:43. doi: 10.12703/p7-43
Nørretranders, T. (1998). The User Illusion: Cutting Consciousness Down to Size.
New York, NY: Viking.
Pau, M., Corona, F., Pili, R., Casula, C., Sors, F., Agostini, T., et al. (2016).
Effects of physical rehabilitation integrated with rhythmic auditory stimulation
on spatio-temporal and kinematic parameters of gait in Parkinson’s disesase.
Front. Neurol 7:126. doi: 10.3389/fneur.2016.00126
Pavlov, V. A., and Tracey, K. J. (2015). Neural circuitry and immunity. Immunol.
Res. 63, 38–57. doi: 10.1007/s12026-015-8718-1
Pickering, T. G., Davidson, K., Gerin, W., and Schwartz, J. E. (2002). Masked
hypertension. Hypertension 40, 795–796. doi: 10.1161/01.HYP.0000038733.
08436.98
Pickering, T. G., Harshfield, G. A., Kleinert, H. D., Blank, S., and Laragh, J. H.
(1982). Blood pressure during normal daily activities, sleep, and exercise:
comparison of values in normal and hypertensive subjects. JAMA 247, 992–996.
doi: 10.1001/jama.247.7.992
Pickering, T. G., James, G. D., Boddie, C., Harshfield, G. A., Blank, S., and
Laragh, J. H. (1988). How common is white coat hypertension? JAMA 259,
225–228. doi: 10.1001/jama.259.2.225
Popper, K. (1978). Natural selection and the emergence of mind. Dialectica 32,
339–355. doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.1978.tb01321.x
Porges, S. (2007). The polyvagal perspective. Biol. Psychol. 74, 116–143.
doi: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2006.06.009
Pruiksma, K. E., Taylor, D. J., Wachen, J. S., Mintz, J., Young-McCaughan, S.,
Peterson, A. L., et al. (2016). Residual sleep disturbances following
PTSD treatment in active duty military personnel. Psychol. Trauma 8:697.
doi: 10.1037/tra0000150
Rees, C. A. (2014). Lost among the trees? The autonomic nervous system and
paediatrics. Arch. Dis. Child. 99, 552–562. doi: 10.1136/archdischild-2012-
301863
Riede, S. J., van der Vinne, V., and Hut, R. A. (2017). The flexible clock: predictive
and reactive homeostasis, energy balance and the circadian regulation of
sleep-wake timing. J. Exp. Biol. 220, 738–749. doi: 10.1242/jeb.130757
Rief, W., Nestoriuc, Y., Weiss, S., Welzel, E., Barsky, A. J., and Hofmann, S. G.
(2009). Meta-analysis of the placebo response in antidepressant trials. J. Affect.
Disord. 118, 1–8. doi: 10.1016/j.jad.2009.01.029
Rigoni, D., Kühn, S., Sartori, G., and Brass, M. (2011). Inducing disbelief in
free will alters brain correlates of preconscious motor preparation: the brain
minds whether we believe in free will or not. Psychol. Sci. 22, 613–618.
doi: 10.1177/0956797611405680
Romero, L. M., Dickens, M. J., and Cyr, N. E. (2009). The reactive scope model—a
new model integrating homeostasis, allostasis, and stress. Horm. Behav. 55,
375–389. doi: 10.1016/j.yhbeh.2008.12.009
Rooney, K. L., and Domar, A. D. (2018). The relationship between stress and
infertility. Dialogues Clin. Neurosci. 20, 41–47.
Ros, T., Frewen, P., Theberge, J., Michela, A., Kluetsch, R.,Mueller, A., et al. (2016).
Neurofeedback tunes scale-free dynamics in spontaneous brain activity. Cereb.
Cortex 27, 4911–4922. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhw285
Rosenberg, S. L., Miller, G. E., Brehm, J. M., and Celedón, J. C. (2014).
Stress and asthma: novel insights on genetic, epigenetic, and immunologic
mechanisms. J. Allergy Clin. Immunol. 134, 1009–1015. doi: 10.1016/j.jaci.2014.
07.005
Sapolsky, R. M. (2004).Why Zebras Don’t Get Ulcers. New York, NY: Henry Holt.
Schedlowski, M., Enck, P., Rief, W., and Bingel, U. (2015). Neuro-bio-behavioral
mechanisms of placebo and nocebo responses: implications for clinical trials
and clinical practice. Pharmacol. Rev. 67, 697–730. doi: 10.1124/pr.114.
009423
Seeman, T., Epel, E., Gruenewald, T., Karlamangla, A., and McEwen, B. S. (2010).
Socio-economic differentials in peripheral biology: cumulative allostatic load.
Ann. N Y Acad. Sci. 1186, 223–239. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.05341.x
Sega, R., Cesana, G., Bombelli, M., Grassi, G., Stella, M. L., Zanchetti, A., et al.
(1998). Seasonal variations in home and ambulatory blood pressure in the
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 19 April 2019 | Volume 13 | Article 129
Lee Paradigm of Allostatic Orchestration
PAMELA population. J. Hypertens. 16, 1585–1592. doi: 10.1097/00004872-
199816110-00004
Selye, H. (1956). The Stress of Life. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Shew, W. L., and Plenz, D. (2013). The functional benefits of criticality in the
cortex. Neuroscientist 19, 88–100. doi: 10.1177/1073858412445487
Shook, J. R., and Giordano, J. (2016). Neuroethics beyond normal: performance
enablement and self-transformative technologies. Camb. Q. Healthc. Ethics 25,
121–140. doi: 10.1017/S0963180115000377
Srere, H. K., Wang, L. C., and Martin, S. L. (1992). Central role for differential
gene expression in mammalian hibernation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U S A 89,
7119–7123. doi: 10.1073/pnas.89.15.7119
Steenkamp, M. M., Litz, B. T., Hoge, C. W., and Marmar, C. R. (2015).
Psychotherapy formilitary-related PTSD: a review of randomized clinical trials.
JAMA 314, 489–500. doi: 10.1001/jama.2015.8370
Steiner, R. (1894). The Philosophy of Freedom: The Basis for a Modern World
Conception. Trans. M. Wilson. East Sussex, UK: Rudolf Steiner Press.
Sterling, P. (2004). ‘‘Principles of allostasis: optimal design, predictive regulation,
pathophysiology and rational therapeutics,’’ in Allostasis, Homeostasis, and the
Costs of Physiological Adaptation, ed. J. Schulkin (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press), 17–64.
Sterling, P. (2012). Allostasis: a model of predictive regulation. Physiol. Behav. 106,
5–15. doi: 10.1016/j.physbeh.2011.06.004
Sterling, P. (2014). Homeostasis vs. allostasis: implications for brain
function and mental disorders. JAMA Psychiatry 71, 1192–1193.
doi: 10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2014.1043
Sterling, P., and Eyer, J. (1988). ‘‘Allostasis: a new paradigm to explain arousal
pathology,’’ in Handbook of Life Stress, Cognition and Health, eds S. Fisher and
J. Reason (New York, NY: J. Wiley and Sons), 629–649.
Streeter, C. C., Gerbarg, P. L., Saper, R. B., Ciraulo, D. A., and Brown, R. P.
(2012). Effects of yoga on the autonomic nervous system, γ-aminobutyric-acid
and allostasis in epilepsy, depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. Med.
Hypotheses 78, 571–579. doi: 10.1016/j.mehy.2012.01.021
Taleb, N. (2007). The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable.New York,
NY: Random House.
Taleb, N. (2012). Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder. New York, NY:
Random House.
Tedeschi, R. G., and Calhoun, L. G. (2004). Posttraumatic growth: conceptual
foundations and empirical evidence. Psychol. Inq. 15, 1–18.
Thiel, P. (2014). Zero to One: Notes on Startups, or How to Build the Future. New
York, NY: Penguin Random House Company.
Trowbridge, M. J., Worden, K., and Pyke, C. (2016). Using green building as a
model for making health promotion standard in the built environment. Health
Aff. 35, 2062–2067. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.2016.1020
Tuttle, A. H., Tohyama, S., Ramsay, T., Kimmelman, J., Schweinhardt, P.,
Bennett, G. J., et al. (2015). Increasing placebo responses over time in US
clinical trials of neuropathic pain. Pain 156, 2616–2626. doi: 10.1097/j.pain.
0000000000000333
Ulrich, R. S. (1984). View through a windowmay influence recovery from surgery.
Science 224, 420–421. doi: 10.1126/science.6143402
VanElzakker, M. B., Dahlgren, M. K., Davis, F. C., Dubois, S., and Shin, L. M.
(2014). From Pavlov to PTSD: the extinction of conditioned fear in
rodents, humans and anxiety disorders. Neurobiol. Learn. Mem. 113, 3–18.
doi: 10.1016/j.nlm.2013.11.014
Wang, T. Y., Wei, H. T., Liou, Y. J., Su, T. P., Bai, Y. M., Tsai, S. J., et al. (2016). Risk
for developing dementia among patients with posttraumatic stress disorder: a
nationwide longitudinal study. J. Affect. Disord. 205, 306–310. doi: 10.1016/j.
jad.2016.08.013
Williamson, J. B., Porges, E. C., Lamb, D. G., and Porges, S.W. (2015).Maladaptive
autonomic regulation in PTSD accelerates physiological aging. Front. Psychol.
5:1571. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01571
Wolff, J. L., Starfield, B., and Anderson, G. (2002). Prevalence, expenditures and
complications of multiple chronic conditions in the elderly. Arch. Intern. Med.
162, 2269–2276. doi: 10.1001/archinte.162.20.2269
World Health Organization. (1948). Preamble to the constitution of the world
health organization as adopted by the International Health Conference, New
York, 19–22 June, 1946; signed on 22 July 1946 by the representatives of
61 States (Official Records of the World Health Organization, no. 2, p. 100)
and entered into force on 7 April 1948.
Yehuda, R., Hoge, C. W., McFarlane, A. C., Vermetten, E., Lanius, R. A.,
Nievergelt, C. M., et al. (2015). Post-traumatic stress disorder. Nat. Rev. Dis.
Primers 1:15057. doi: 10.1038/nrdp.2015.57
Yun, A. J., Lee, P. Y., and Bazar, K. A. (2004). Many diseases may reflect
dysfunctions of autonomic balance attributable to evolutionary displacement.
Med. Hypotheses 62, 847–851. doi: 10.1016/j.mehy.2004.02.006
Conflict of Interest Statement: The author was formerly an employee at
Brain State Technologies LLC, a company that has developed an allostatic
neurotechnology, and he retains stock options with the company.
Copyright © 2019 Lee. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution
or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s)
and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication
in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No
use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with
these terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 20 April 2019 | Volume 13 | Article 129
